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Abstract This article examines how two types of Japanese business group
networks impact on firm innovation and global learning. Both the general network
and Japanese business group literature have emphasized the important role this
kind of tightly knit and stable network plays in facilitating the innovation of firms.
Yet little is known of the different effects of the two types of business groups on
innovation: horizontal versus vertical. In this article, we argue that the horizontal
business group network, owing to its inter-industry conglomerate structure,
promotes innovation of a wider knowledge-exploration type, whereas the vertical
business group network, owing to its intra-industry supply chain linkage, promotes
innovation of a close knowledge-exploitation type. In terms of global learning,
it is hypothesized that the more domestically explorative horizontal business
group network imposes a constraint on international innovation, whereas the
vertical business group network does not. Empirical results largely support these
arguments.
Asian Business & Management (2011) 10, 151–181. doi:10.1057/abm.2011.7;
published online 2 March 2011
Keywords: Interfirm networks; innovation and R&D; global learning; exploration
and exploitation; business groups; Japan

Introduction
It has been widely recognized that tightly knit business group networks have
greatly facilitated the technological innovation of Japanese firms (for example,
Gerlach, 1992; Goto and Odagiri, 1997; Ozawa, 2005). On the other hand, it is
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also often found that belonging to these tightly knit networks has placed
limitations on the international network-building and global learning and
innovation activities of these firms (for example, Westney, 1993; Asakawa,
1996; Lam, 2003; Collinson and Wilson, 2006). However, in considering the
benefits and costs of Japanese business group networks, the existing literature
has not paid attention to the different structures of the horizontal and vertical
types of business group networks and thus their different impacts. This is
surprising, given that the wider literature on Japanese business groups has
emphasized that the horizontal and vertical types are highly distinctive in
nature (for example, Gerlach, 1992; Dodwell, 1994/95).
The purpose of this article is to examine how these two major kinds of
Japanese business networks, horizontal and vertical, owing to their different
interfirm linkage mechanisms, may impact firm innovation and global
learning in very different ways. We develop here two models of innovation
that correspond to the different characteristics of the two types of Japanese
business group networks. By analyzing data on US patents granted to the
largest Japanese industrial firms, we show that horizontal and vertical
business group networks promote innovation and influence global learning in
different ways.
In this study, we find that horizontal networks facilitate a process of knowledge exploration among partner firms, which leads to innovation through
broad combinations of knowledge across different industries or the novel
application of knowledge in another industry. Instead, vertical networks
facilitate a process of intensified knowledge exploitation among partner firms
in a connected production system, which leads to innovation through better
integration and coordination of interdependent technologies in the supply
chain of complex multi-technology products or systems. Furthermore, in terms
of their effects on global learning, we contend that horizontal networks may
substitute for the exploration of diverse knowledge overseas and can thus
become a constraint on developing global networks and global learning,
whereas vertical networks should not exhibit this negative substitution effect
on the development of exploratory global knowledge networks. In the
following, we will first introduce the relevant literature and then use evidence
on the largest industrial firms in Japan to explore these different impacts by
horizontal and vertical Japanese business group networks on innovation and
global learning.

Literature Review
Interfirm networks have become increasingly important to firms’ external knowledge access, innovation, and firm value and performance (Powell et al, 1996;
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Gulati et al, 2000; Kogut, 2000). At present, technology is becoming
increasingly complex and knowledge is increasingly distributed across
different organizations or different sub-units of the same organization. Thus,
innovation is not the sole consequence of firms’ own activities considered
individually in isolation, but also of the networks to which they belong (Van
de Ven et al, 1999; Zaheer and Bell, 2005).
In today’s global business environment, firms have increasingly realized that
they need to combine knowledge not only from a diversity of organizational
sources, but also from a diversity of geographical sources (Cantwell, 1989;
Dunning and Wymbs, 1999). The speed of technological development is
becoming relentless and knowledge more dispersed in the world (Murtha et al,
2001). Thus, firms are putting increasing emphasis on global knowledgesourcing (Kümmerle, 1999; Frost, 2001) and on building an international
knowledge network (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Nohria and Ghoshal, 1997).
As is well known, interfirm networking is pervasive in Japanese society: most
Japanese firms are embedded in some form of interfirm network. In particular,
a sizeable proportion of the largest Japanese firms belong to certain business
groups (so-called keiretsu or industrial groups), which represent the clearest
and strongest form of Japanese interfirm network. Japanese business group or
keiretsu networks are tightly knit and long-term stable exclusive relationships,
in which firms support one another in the spirit of reciprocity and mutual
obligation. These kinds of tightly knit and closed interfirm networks generate
the benefit of mutual trust and understanding, promote closer cooperation
and more efficient knowledge transfer, and facilitate knowledge creation and
innovation (Coleman, 1988; Ahuja, 2000). In Japan, these strong relationships
among firms within business group networks have enabled technological
capabilities to be created and upgraded much more efficiently within and across
a broad range of industries in a coordinated fashion (Imai, 1989; Kodama, 1995;
Ozawa, 2005).
On the other hand, closed networks with stable relationships may be less able
to offer fresh and diverse perspectives (Rowley et al, 2000; Burt, 2005). The
recent Toyota car recall crisis gives us a glimpse into the dilemma that a closed
culture and organizational structure, insulated from outside influences, can
lead to great efficiency, but also sometimes to serious problems and a lack of
perspective. Closed networks serve well the purpose of knowledge exploitation,
whereas open networks are more suitable for knowledge exploration (Baum
and Ingram, 2000); and both of these processes of new knowledge generation
(a suitable balance between exploitation and exploration in learning) are
needed for firms to achieve competitive advantage (March, 1991).
Therefore, researchers have suggested that firms should complement
any closed network in which they are embedded with bridges to other
more open networks or groups (for example, Granovetter, 1983; Uzzi, 1997;
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Brass et al, 2004). Burt (2005) suggests that the best performance can be
achieved when network closure within the group is high and structural holes
outside the group are rich.
However, balancing the relationship between a closed network and a wider
external open network may not be easy. Just like the difficulty of achieving
a suitable balance between knowledge exploitation and exploration (March,
1991), a closed and an open network not only compete for limited resources,
but require different mentalities and ways of thinking (Blau, 1974; Levinthal
and March, 1993). Closed and exclusive member networks imply significant
time and resource obligations, which impose constraints on how many outside
links a firm may be able to develop (Benner and Tushman, 2003; Lavie and
Rosenkopf, 2006).
Therefore, a question arises: how can firms maintain both a closed internal
network and an open external network at the same time in order to enjoy the
benefits of both? What are the factors that affect firms’ ability to achieve this
combination? These are exactly the questions that Japanese firms have been
facing. As Ozawa (2005) has pointed out, this kind of closed business group
network has had both a ‘knowledge-creation’ and a ‘knowledge-diversion’
effect. In the early stages of Japan’s catch-up, when network members were
treated preferentially to actors outside the network, knowledge flows were
increased between network members, leading to a successful synthesis and
synergy in idea generation and technology formation (a ‘knowledge-creation’
effect). Yet over time, with the overly introverted focus of the group, knowledge
flows were reduced between network members and outsiders, and these
relationships have become constraining as the nature of industrial technology
has become more complex and the scope of business operations increasingly
globalized (a ‘knowledge diversion’ effect). This is analogous to the ‘tradecreation’ and ‘trade-diversion’ effects associated with a customs union (Viner,
1960). Best (2000) contends that the Japanese model of industrial organization
results in a national innovation system that is better at incremental rather than
radical innovation, because of its structure of ‘closed system integration’.
Japanese firms have indeed been trying to build a transnational network to
overcome the weaknesses of their domestic networks and national system of
innovation. Since the 1980s, Japanese firms have been investing vigorously
in R&D sites abroad for the purpose of tapping into capabilities elsewhere
(for example, Kogut and Chang, 1991; Pearce and Singh, 1992; Florida and
Kenney, 1994; Granstrand, 1999; Iwasa and Odagiri, 2004; Penner-Hahn and
Shaver, 2005; Berry, 2006). However, the paradox is that, although Japanese
firms have been aggressively investing in R&D abroad to build an international
network of innovation, existing empirical evidence suggests that Japanese firms
have continued to generate only a very low level of innovation originating from
international locations (for example, Patel, 1995; Belderbos, 2001; Cantwell
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and Zhang, 2006).1 Many detailed organizational studies through interviews
have also provided more direct evidence that the Japanese institutional environment, and especially the embeddedness of firms in tightly integrated organizational and business systems at home, has constrained the ability of Japanese firms
to effectively engage with and learn from more open international knowledge
networks (Westney, 1993; Asakawa, 1996; Lam, 2003; Collinson and Wilson,
2006).
However, the distinction between horizontal and vertical business groups in
their respective effects on firm innovation and global learning has never been
explicitly examined. Thus, the central purpose of this article is to better understand the different effects of the two major types of business group networks –
the horizontal and the vertical – on Japanese firm innovation and global
learning. In what follows, the next section outlines the theory and hypotheses,
the subsequent section describes the data and methodology, the penultimate
section discusses the results, and finally the last section concludes.

Two Models of Japanese Innovation Networks
Institutional context
A business group is a grouping or family of affiliated companies with
interlocking business relationships and shareholdings that in effect form a
tightly knit alliance to work toward each other’s mutual success (Dodwell,
1994/95). Keiretsu (Japanese business groups) can be classified into two major
types: horizontally connected and vertically connected. Although having much
in common, these two types are distinct in their fundamental nature and
interfirm linkage mechanisms.2 It is important to emphasize that what we
study here are business groups in their form up to 1995, as they had been
relatively stable before that, but since then much has changed in these business
group relationships. Especially in the horizontal groups, there have been, for
example, mergers of banks that made the boundaries of some keiretsu very
fuzzy. Japanese business groups have an enormous influence on the Japanese
economy and they occupy major proportions of major industries such as
oil, chemical, shipbuilding, steel, mining, automobiles, electric and electronic
devices and so on.
Horizontally connected groups are large inter-industry combinations of the
conglomerate type, centered on large commercial banks and general trading
companies, and consist of affiliated companies in a broad range of industries.
Although having undergone major changes in recent years, for most of the
postwar period there have been eight major horizontal keiretsu: Mitsubishi,
Mitsui, Sumitomo, Fuyo, Sanwa, DKB, Tokai and IBJ, with the first-named
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‘big six’ tracing their origins back to the pre-World War II zaibatsu. A
horizontal business group is mainly set up for the purpose of business
promotion, sharing financial risk, mutual support in times of financial
difficulty and protection against hostile takeovers. The members of each
horizontal business group are connected through a crossholding of shares,
mutual appointment of directors, financing and intra-group transactions.
Vertically connected groups refer to a family of vertically linked supply chain
operations that cluster around their (usually downstream assembly) parent
companies, and whose operations are closely coordinated by the parent
company. In contrast to horizontal business groups, vertical groups consist of
affiliated companies that function as suppliers and distributors within the same
industry. Typical vertical groups include groups such as Toyota, Nissan,
Matsushita, Nippon Steel, Hitachi, Toshiba and Sony. The parent company
maintains a strong committed relationship with its affiliates through the
holding of partial equity stakes, maintaining purchase volumes of products and
services, provision of production/marketing know-how and licensing, and
sometimes even by appointing the CEO and/or other directors.

Theoretical framework and hypotheses
Figure 1 presents the theoretical framework of the different interfirm
knowledge-creation mechanisms in the two types of interfirm networks.
In the following, we elaborate on theoretical framework together with the
associated hypotheses.
Although the original motives of the horizontal business group were mostly
financial, to diversify and share risk, and to protect against hostile takeovers,
in sociological terms a horizontal group constitutes a far-flung web with
a central core that operates collectively, helping to pull together various
industrial segments and forming a community of firms that support and share
knowledge with one another (Lincoln et al, 1996). Monthly presidential clubs
serve as major forums for interfirm information flows; and cooperative
projects and personnel connections provide important means for interaction
among management and technical personnel from different firms (Gerlach,
1987). For example, the Mitsubishi Group, the largest industrial keiretsu
in Japan, has a very high level of equity cross-shareholding, directors are
routinely exchanged among group companies, and its major companies span
broad industries such as Mitsubishi Bank, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries,
Mitsubishi Oil, Mitsubishi Gas Chemical, Mitsubishi Motors, Mitsubishi
Electric, Nikon, Kirin Brewery and so on.
Horizontal groups help member firms in their endeavors to enter new
product markets, through the benefits of a convenient pre-existing structure for
156 r 2011 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1472-4782
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Inter-Firm Knowledge Creation
Mechanisms

Inter-Firm Connections

Horizontal Keiretsu:
Inter- industry
conglomerates

Knowledge Exploration:
• Promotes combinations of
complementary technologies and
diffusion of general purpose
technologies
• Innovations tend to be more novel and
science or information-based
• Substitutes for knowledge exploration
abroad

Vertical Keiretsu:
Intra- industry
supply chains

Knowledge Exploitation:
• Promotes close coordination,
integration and interaction among
users and producers in production
and innovation
• Centrally coordinated by core firms
• Innovations tend to be incremental
and more engineering-based
• Core firms benefit most due to central
coordination function

Hypotheses on Firm Innovation
and Global Learning

H1: horizontal tie innovation
growth (+)

H2: horizontal tie international
innovation (-)

H3a: vertical tie number of
innovations (+)
H3b: vertical tie technological
diversification (+)
H4a: core firm number of
innovations (+)
H4b: core firm technological
diversification (+)

Figure 1: Theoretical framework.

sharing information, joint financing or risk reduction, and to carry out interindustry collaboration in the development of technology and innovation
(Japan Fair Trade Commission, 2001). It has been widely recognized in the
literature that, in a tightly knit and stable interfirm network, not only will
partners have a greater motivation to share knowledge and recipients have
more trust in the knowledge being shared (for example, Mayer et al, 1995; Tsai
and Ghoshal, 1998), but knowledge shared will be more useful because of a
deeper understanding of the context of the recipients (Matusik and Hill, 1998),
and thus can be more easily combined with the internal capabilities of the
recipients to enhance their innovation.
When collaboration among traditional horizontal business group firms has
taken place, it has tended to cross industry boundaries and involve something
new for a recipient industry. Interview data suggest that firms look readily to
members of the same business group for research partners (Doane, 1984),
especially if they need knowledge drawn from multiple fields. This opportunity
for diverse inter-industry knowledge exchanges enhances the prospects for
innovation. Table 1 (from Samuels, 1987) shows some of the joint research
projects initiated by horizontal groups in the mid-1980s. For example, as
Kodama (1995) recounted, the joint efforts of NSG (glass producer), NEC
(electronic device producer) and SEI (cable manufacturer), all of which are
r 2011 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1472-4782
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Table 1: Collaborative research projects organized by Japanese industrial groups (1985–1986)
Group

Project

# of Firms

Date

Mitsui

Bioreactor research
Electronic shopping
Hardened concrete
Bioengineering

9
2
2
25

8/85
10/85
10/85
3/85

Mitsubishi

Synthetic cable
Industrial robots
Metal alloys

2
3
2

10/85
11/85
12/85

Sumitomo

Industrial robots
Computer chemistry

2
2

12/85
3/85

Fuyo

Plating

2

NA

DKB

Industrial robots
Banking software
Automated steelmaking
Fine ceramics
Radio darkroom

3
2
2
2
2

6/85
8/85
11/85
12/85
4/86

Sanwa

Auto parts
Biomaterials
Bioreactor
Artificial intelligence
Biotechnology

2
3
3
19
22

8/85
11/85
4/86
4/86
5/86

Source: Samuels (1987) from Keizaichosa Kyokai (ed.), Keiretsu no Kenkyuu, Vol. 27 (1986).

Sumitomo group members, contributed to integrating the different areas of
technology required for the Japanese development of optical communications
technology.
The inter-industry conglomerate character of horizontal business groups
provides a ready-made platform for knowledge exploration, facilitated by crossindustry connections between firms that help them to combine complementary
technologies in different fields, and to diffuse general-purpose technologies from
one industry to another (Imai, 1989). As is well known, technologies have become
increasingly interrelated, as innovation has become more and more dependent on
recombinations of complementary knowledge, and multiple applications of
general-purpose technologies in new areas (Schumpeter, 1934; Rosenberg, 1976;
Teece et al, 1994; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). There is an ever-greater role
being played by general-purpose technologies that have the characteristic of being
extremely pervasive, and which are relevant to and act to transform the nature
of production in a wide variety of industries, such as electrical equipment
158 r 2011 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1472-4782
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technologies (from the late nineteenth century onwards), and most recently and
prominently information and communication technologies (ICT) (Lipsey et al,
1998; Hall and Trajtenberg, 2006).
Thus, horizontal interfirm networks tend to promote innovation of a
more science-based or information-based type (Pavitt, 1984; Tidd et al, 2005),
providing an inter-industry collaborative environment that facilitates the
provision of a common knowledge base grounded in science and arising from
the forging of new combinations of knowledge. These, combined with wide
diffusion and applications of general-purpose technologies across industries,
tend to induce a faster rate of growth in innovation and technological change
(Rosenberg, 1976; Freeman and Perez, 1988; Gambardella and Torrisi, 1998).
Thus, the first hypothesis is as follows.
Hypothesis 1:

Firms that have stronger ties with a horizontal business group
network tend to achieve a higher innovation growth rate as
represented by the growth of total patenting.

In an era in which knowledge is becoming increasingly complicated and
dispersed around the world, firms often find they need to seek out knowledge
globally in order to stand at the cutting edge. Japanese firms, like others, have
increasingly gone abroad to access new knowledge (for example, Patel and
Pavitt, 1991; Penner-Hahn and Shaver, 2005). However, in horizontal business
groups, firms usually prefer to rely on other member firms at home for access
to complementary technologies, owing to the reciprocity, commitment, and
mutual obligation and preferential treatment among the business group firms.
Relationships are costly to maintain and firms face limitations on the number
of relationships they can productively forge. As the domestic horizontal
network has mainly served the purpose of knowledge exploration, it becomes
a substitute for the development of an international network for the purpose of
external knowledge search and acquisition.
Thus, firms that are locked into domestic network commitments are likely
to be more constrained by their existing relationships at home, which hinder
their capacity to expand their R&D network abroad for the purpose of knowledge exploration and interaction. Since the recent evolution of subsidiaries in
multinational firms towards greater local creativity, and hence an increased
intensity of international innovation that depends on the local embeddedness
of subsidiaries in their host country innovation networks (for example,
Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998; Andersson et al, 2002), constraints on the
achievement of local embeddedness are likely to be reflected in a lower longerterm share of international corporate innovation. Foreign firms may also find
companies in horizontal business groups less desirable partners, because of the
concern that the knowledge that a foreign firm shares with a partner may
end up in the hands of domestic associates of the recipient that are direct
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competitors in the same industry as the foreign firm. Thus, Hypothesis 2 is as
follows:
Hypothesis 2:

Firms that have stronger ties with a horizontal business group
tend to have a lower share of international innovation as
represented by the share of corporate patents attributable to
foreign invention.

In contrast to the inter-industry horizontal business group network, the
purpose of the vertical business group network is to enable the effective
coordination of complex activities along the supply chain of some modern
sophisticated multi-technology products with multiple components. Innovation in a vertical supply chain tends to be oriented towards knowledge
exploitation: it tends to be incremental and engineering-based, and highly
interdependent and reliant on interactions between multiple levels of users and
producers (Lundvall, 1988). In such industries, in which activities are more
highly vertically connected, close and trusting relationships among firms in a
vertical business group network facilitate higher individual company specialization on the one hand, yet at the same time better integration and interaction
among these specialized firms. Compared with either arm’s-length transactions
or pure vertical integration, a network supply chain governance mechanism
can more effectively ensure and hence reap the benefits of innovation from
both specialization and integration, and enhance both product and process
innovation (Richardson, 1972).
From a transaction cost perspective, the long-term stable relationships
among firms in vertical business group networks enable supplier firms to invest
more in specific innovation in their specialized areas, often customized for
the parent company, without having to worry about asset specificity and
appropriation hazards (Williamson, 1975; Teece, 1992). The parent company
will reward supplier innovation by paying a higher price and assuming some of
the risk in innovation, as in the case of the partnership between Toyota and
Nippon Denso, its core engine supplier. Buyer–supplier relations in a Japanese
vertical business group network have sometimes been characterized as
‘benevolent’ and ‘symbiotic’ rather than ‘exploitative’ (Nishiguchi, 1994).
From an organizational learning perspective, vertical business group
networks enable better learning and closer collaboration among multiple
levels of users and suppliers, with the parent company providing coordinated
routines and technical assistance that facilitate effective learning and knowledge-sharing among members. One example is the strong support Toyota
provides to its suppliers via the supplier association, plus the socialization and
mutual support among suppliers in the association (Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000).
Thus, owing to transaction cost and learning advantages, firms in vertical
business group networks are likely to invest in a higher scale of innovation
160 r 2011 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1472-4782
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activities, achieve better learning and thus be more innovative. Vertical
business group networks help achieve more efficient production and a wider
range of industry-specific innovation within any given firm through a more
intensive cross-firm system for knowledge exploitation. For example, Toyoda
Koki, a firm affiliated with Toyota Motor, has been able to sustain the
strongest technological position in terms of US patent grants for machine tools
(Lee, 1998). Therefore, we would expect vertical business group firms to have a
greater number of innovation accomplishments, as in Hypothesis 3a.
Hypothesis 3a:

Firms that have stronger ties with a vertical business group
network tend to achieve more innovations, as represented by
the level of patenting.

Furthermore, as modern products become increasingly sophisticated, they
rely on a wider range of technologies to support them (Granstrand et al, 1997;
Bonaccorsi and Giuri, 2001). Therefore, firms in industries in which the supply
chain is a major source of innovation for downstream assembly firms need
to understand not only the areas in which they themselves are engaged in
production, but also the related fields of specialization of their suppliers or
customers – they need to know more than they make (Brusoni et al, 2001).
Vertical business group networks facilitate knowledge co-specialization and
integration by providing a stable network environment for continuous
knowledge exchanges and mutual learning about user needs and supplier
capabilities, and coordinated routines and shared identities (Nelson and
Winter, 1982; Kogut and Zander, 1992). For example, in Toyota and Denso
(one of the core members in the Toyota Motor Group) engineers routinely
work on projects together, and they have joint patents and papers. Thus, we
have Hypothesis 3b.
Hypothesis 3b:

Firms that have stronger ties with a vertical business group
network tend to be more technologically diversified, as
measured by the extent of spread of patents across technological fields.

This efficient system of exploitation of innovation requires a central
coordinating mechanism, and that takes the form of a core company within
the vertical business group network being responsible for that. In the process,
that core company, usually a downstream part of the supply chain, is likely to
become much bigger and more diversified than parts suppliers. Thus, this type
of vertical innovation system is likely to lead to a consistent variation in the
extent of capabilities across firms, in which core firms are bigger and more
diversified than non-core, because of their central coordinating role. Thus, we
expect that the distribution of innovative activities of firms within a vertical
network is likely to be more polarized or concentrated than the equivalent
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distribution in a horizontal network, or in the absence of an interfirm
partnership network.
There are two ways in which we might interpret or conceptualize the likely
concentration of knowledge resources in the core firm of a vertical network.
The first kind of interpretation follows from the arguments just presented
in connection with Hypotheses 3a and 3b. That is, the concentration of
knowledge resources in the core firm of each vertical business group enables
these centrally positioned companies to act as facilitator and promoter of
innovation in other firms in their network, typically by supporting the knowledge requirements of their suppliers. This is consistent with the contention that
vertical group membership provides suppliers with technical, managerial and
financial support from core firms, and a stimulus to innovation through their
close and continuous contact with the user needs of these core firms (Suzuki,
1993; Dyer and Singh, 1998).
However, an alternative – and less benevolent – potential interpretation may
be that a skewed distribution of knowledge-creation facilities across the firms of
a vertical business group is likely to reflect a system of exploitation of peripheral
firms by core firms. Vertical keiretsu agreements may impose restrictions on the
scope for innovation considered by suppliers. Vertical groups may transfer
profits and financial resources to their core firms (Lincoln and Gerlach, 2004),
which hence provide core companies with a greater capacity to invest in new
knowledge creation and innovation than is generally feasible for non-core firms
of a vertical group. This uneven power structure within vertical groups may
have been reinforced by the focus of Japanese government support on core
firms, increasing their capacity to expropriate the patentable technology of their
suppliers (Ibata-Arens and Obayashi, 2006).
These are two different interpretations of the character of vertical business
group networks, with one focused on the efficiency of knowledge and product
exchange mechanisms, and the other focused on issues of relative power or
authority within the group. Although for many purposes it is critical to
distinguish between them, for our own immediate purpose what they have in
common is that they both suggest an expectation of the heterogeneity of
firms in a vertical keiretsu in their innovative capabilities, and in particular
concentration of knowledge-creation activities in the core firms of vertical
business groups. Therefore, we have Hypotheses 4a and 4b.
Hypothesis 4a:

The core firms in a vertical business group network tend to
achieve more innovations, as represented by the level of
patenting.

Hypothesis 4b: The core firms in a vertical business group network tend to be
more technologically diversified, as measured by the extent of
spread of patents across technological fields.
162 r 2011 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1472-4782
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In terms of global learning, vertical business group networks, unlike the
horizontal type, are not expected to negatively affect the extent of international
innovation in member firms. The rationale is that having a domestic network
that is engaged in the closer coordination of innovation along the supply
chain (a more intense exploitation of knowledge held in common, facilitating
incremental innovation) relies on network exclusivity of a narrower type. It
does not inhibit firms from seeking complementary technologies from relevant
science and technology centers abroad (exploring novel applications and
combinations of knowledge taken from other fields). Indeed, such domestic
and international networks can easily coexist with one another. For example,
one of the reasons that attracted Nissan to invest in Mississippi was to partner
with the Center for Advanced Vehicular Systems at Mississippi State University,
and tap into its strengths in both basic and applied research related to vehicles.
The University’s computational engineering and fluid dynamics technologies
helped Nissan improve its crash simulation technology and shorten product
development times.

Methods
Data
We analyze 131 Japanese industrial firms, all the Japanese companies
represented in the world’s 770 largest or technologically strongest industrial
firms, excluding service industries such as banking. The patenting activity of
international corporate groups has been consolidated for these 770 firms as of
1982; corporate groups were identified from listings in the Fortune 500 US and
global companies (Dunning and Pearce, 1985).3 These corporate patent data
were compiled by Professor John Cantwell of Rutgers Business School with the
assistance of the USPTO (see Cantwell, 1995). The period 1969–1995 was
chosen in view of the fact that Japanese firms’ patenting was very limited until
the 1960s, but took off sharply subsequently; and that the traditional structures
of the business groups or keiretsu began to change and weaken in the postbubble years from the mid-1990s onwards (for example, Lincoln and Gerlach,
2004).
These consolidated corporate groups were also allocated to their primary
industry of output according to the product distribution of their sales
(Dunning and Pearce, 1985), such that corporate patenting has been divided
into 16 broad industrial groups. Each patent is also classified by the field of
technological activity with which it is primarily associated, thereby defining
56 fields using a classification scheme derived from the US patent class system.
It should be emphasized that this technological classification of each individual
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patent is quite distinct from the industry (output) classification of the firm to
which the patent is granted. For example, a firm in the chemical industry may
have a patent in a machinery field associated with some chemical engineering
processes. Finally, the country of origin of the parent company was recorded,
and those of Japanese origin selected for the purposes of this study. In addition,
business group or keiretsu affiliation information of the 131 firms was collected
from Industrial Groupings in Japan (Dodwell, 1994/95). Of the 131 Japanese
firms, 95 were identified as belonging to a horizontal or vertical business group
(six belonged to both), and 36 were non-affiliated to business groups.
Measurement
Dependent variables
The dependent variables relate to firms’ innovative activities, and their measurements here are based on patent data. For Hypothesis 1, firms’ innovation
growth rates are measured by the growth in the number of patents granted
from the period 1969–1982 to 1983–1995. For Hypothesis 2, the extent of a
firm’s international innovation is measured by the share of the firm’s total
patents originating from invention or research in locations abroad (outside
Japan), as indicated by the residence of the first-named inventor on each
patent. For Hypotheses 3a and 4a, a firm’s level of innovation is measured by
the total number of US patents that the firm has achieved during the period
1969–1995. For Hypotheses 3b and 4b, corporate technological diversification
is measured by a DIV index4 (Cantwell, 2004), which is a cross-field variancebased measure constructed based on the extent of the spread of activity across
the fields of technological specialization, defined by using a technological
classification of patents derived from the US patent class system.
Focal independent variables
As the study focuses on the effect of Japanese business group networks on the
domestic and international innovation of firms, our principal focal independent variables are dummy variables that indicate, respectively, whether or not a
firm belongs to a horizontal or vertical business group network, and a measure
of how strong is that tie to a network. As mentioned before, ties with a
horizontal or vertical business group are two different dimensions of a firm’s
set of relationships, rather than simple alternatives along a single dimension,
with a few firms belonging to both.
In the simplest version, membership of either a horizontal or vertical keiretsu
is defined through the use of a binary dummy variable, which takes a value of
one where the firm belongs to the relevant type of network, and zero otherwise.
Alternatively, the horizontal and vertical business group affiliation variables
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have been recorded on a scale of 0 to 4, with 0 meaning the firm is not part of
a business group, and 1, 2, 3 or 4 if it belongs to a business group, with a higher
number denoting greater strength of tie. The Industrial Groupings in Japan
(Dodwell, 1994/95) determines each firm’s business group affiliation, and each
firm’s strength of tie to the group based on a number of factors.5
In order to further examine the business group affiliation and strength
effects, we also created various other dummy variables for the strength and
form of business group affiliation, in order to experiment with different model
formulations. These further dummy variables include: strong horizontal
affiliation (with a tie strength of 3 or 4), weak horizontal affiliation connection
(with tie strength of 1 or 2), vertical core firm (with tie strength 4) and vertical
non-core firm (with tie strength of 1 or 2). An inspection of our data revealed
that of the firms belonging to vertical business groups, none had a tie strength
of 3. The fact that in the vertical case core firms occupying a central position
in their respective networks are also those with the strongest ties to other firms
in their network means that in practice it is difficult for us to distinguish
Hypotheses 3a and 3b from Hypotheses 4a and 4b. We return to this issue in
our discussion and interpretation of the findings.
Control variables
Industry dummy variables are added as controls for all the hypotheses to allow
for different technology characteristics and varying propensities to patent
across industries. The selection of these industry dummies depends on the
significance of certain industries in the Japanese economy, and the distinctive
technological characteristics of industries in terms of firm innovation, diversification and internationalization. In addition, we need to control for the wellknown inter-industry variations in the propensity to patent (Scherer, 1983).
The industrial groups represented by dummies include the chemical and
pharmaceutical industry, metals and mechanical engineering industry, electrical and electronic industry, motor vehicles and transportation industry, and
non-metallic mineral products industry.

Results and Discussion
As our focal concern in this study is to look at the effects of business group
affiliation on a set of different dependent variables, we begin the analysis with
a table of summary statistics that shows the different mean values for our
variables of interest, depending on whether or not the firms belong to a
horizontal or vertical business group. Table 2 gives some idea of the effects
of business group affiliation by showing the mean values of the dependent
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Table 2: The mean value of dependent variables depending on whether firms belong to horizontal
and vertical business group network or not
Whether firms
belong to horizontal
business group or not

1
2
3
4

Firm
Firm
Firm
Firm

number of innovations
technological diversification
innovation growth rate
international innovation level

Whether firms
belong to vertical
business group or not

Yes (n=73)

No (n=54)

Yes (n=26)

No (n=101)

1202.22
0.46
28.94%
1.00%

2072.69
0.47
18.77%
2.01%

3974.38
0.56
44.28%
1.11%

954.99
0.44
19.55%
1.52%

innovation variables for firms that belong to horizontal or vertical business
groups and firms that do not belong to business groups.
Table 3 presents the correlation matrix with means and standard deviations for
all variables. As we can see, the correlations between the various independent
variables are not high enough to raise any particular concerns about
multicollinearity. The high negative correlation between horizontal and vertical
business groups is due to the fact that when firms belong to one type of business
group, they are less likely to belong to another type (although still possible); and
the high correlation between some industry dummy variables arises mainly from
the fact that there are many firms that do not belong to either of the two
industries in a correlation pair. In the correlation matrix, we also see some
potentially interesting industry patterns on innovation and internationalization,
particularly regarding the chemical and pharmaceutical, and electrical and
electronic industries. These observations will be elaborated later in the discussion.
As the main objective of this study is to examine the role of horizontal and
vertical business groups on various innovation variables, different models were
run to test the effect of horizontal and vertical business group networks on
innovation growth rate, number of innovations, technological diversification
and innovation internationalization. Owing to problems associated with low
numbers of patents, the regressions are limited to firms with at least 10 patents
over the period 1969–1995, which leaves 127 firms out of the original 131.
Table 4 presents the results from the regressions.
With respect to the firm innovation growth rate, Models 1 and 2 show that
both horizontal business group affiliation and strength of tie have a highly
significant positive relationship with the innovation growth rate. Therefore,
Hypothesis 1 is strongly supported. This provides support to the idea that
the knowledge-exploration benefits associated with horizontal inter-industry
linkages promote a higher innovation growth of Japanese firms. Moreover,
Model 3 here further shows that this effect is significant for firms having a
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0.71***

0.15*
0.42***
0.13
0.51***
0.14
0.01
0.53***
0.07

0.71***

0.38***

0.06

0.13
0.04
0.12
0.02
0.08
0.08
0.00
0.07

—
—
—

—
—
0.07

0.04
0.08
0.28**
0.16*
0.03
0.09
0.37*** 0.21**
0.01
0.07
0.12
0.04
0.41*** 0.24***
0.13
0.09

—

4

—

3

Asian Business & Management

1572
2929

*Po0.10; **Po0.05; ***Po0.01.

Mean
Standard deviation

0.46
0.18

0.25
0.63

1.44
3.82

—
—
—

—

6

—
—
—

—

7

—
—
—

—

8

—
—
—

—

9

—
—
—

—

10

—
—
—

—

11

0.08

0.57
0.50

0.20
0.41

0.11

2.02
1.89

0.16*

0.19** 0.14
0.44*** 0.23***

0.13
0.21**

0.22**
0.09

0.26*** 0.06

0.10

0.67
1.42

0.11

0.48
0.50

0.16*

0.09
0.28

0.11
0.04

0.14
0.35

0.06
0.24

0.06

0.31*** 0.12
0.15
0.53***
0.07 0.09

0.06
0.11

—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—

—
—
—

—

12

0.41*** 0.17*

0.10 0.18**

0.03

0.24*** 0.14 0.07

0.27*** 0.13
0.30*** 0.23**

0.09

0.20**

0.37*** 0.05

—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.35***
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.93*** 0.34***
—
—
—
—
—
0.28*** 0.93*** 0.27***
—
—
—
—
0.83*** 0.29*** 0.96*** 0.23***
—
—
—
0.26*** 0.09
0.05
0.07
0.30*** —
—
0.20**
0.80*** 0.20**
0.96*** 0.16*
0.04
—
0.30*** 0.51*** 0.28*** 0.18** 0.25*** 0.08 0.11

—
—
—

—

5

Industry control variables
14. Chemical and
0.02
0.00
0.16*
0.24*** 0.15*
pharmaceutical
15. Metals and mechanical 0.16*
0.05
0.06
0.10
0.16*
engineering
16. Electrical and electronic 0.57*** 0.31*** 0.44*** 0.04
0.17**
17. Motor vehicles and
0.01
0.10
0.05
0.06
0.13
transportation
18. Non-metallic mineral
0.09
0.08
0.12
0.12
0.12
products

Control for firm size
13. Log firm number of
innovations

Independent variables
5. Horizontal affiliation
6. Vertical affiliation
7. Horizontal tie strength
8. Vertical tie strength
9. Horizontal strong
10. Horizontal weak
11. Vertical core firm
12. Vertical non-core firm

Dependent variables
1. Firm number of
—
—
innovations
2. Firm tech diversification 0.61***
—
3. Firm innovation growth 0.36*** 0.22**
4. Firm international
0.03
0.03
innovation level

1

Table 3: Correlation matrix, mean and standard deviation of variables

0.20**

—

—

—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—

—
—
—

—

14

—

—

—

—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—

—
—
—

—

15

—

—

—

—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—

—
—
—

—

16

6.11
1.71

0.11

0.16
0.37

0.10

0.18
0.39

0.10

0.17
0.37

0.10

0.53*** 0.19** 0.21**
—
0.01
0.18** 0.20** 0.19**

0.08

0.14

—

—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—

—
—
—

—

13

—

—
—

—

—

—

—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—

—
—
—

—

18

0.15 0.05
0.36 0.21

0.09

—
—

—

—

—

—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—

—
—
—

—

17

Exploration and exploitation

Vol. 10, 2, 151–181 167

168 r 2011 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1472-4782

Adjusted R2
Model significance: P-value of F
N

Industry control variables
Chemical and pharmaceutical
Metals and mechanical engineering
Electrical and electronic
Motor vehicles and transportation
Non-metallic mineral products

Control for firm size
Log of firm number of innovations

Constant
Independent variables
Horizontal affiliation
Vertical affiliation
Horizontal strength of tie
Vertical strength of tie
Horizontal strong connection
Horizontal weak connection
Vertical core firm
Vertical non-core firm

Table 4: Regression results

(0.17)*
(0.15)
(0.19)***
(0.18)
(0.24)

0.25
o0.0001
127

0.29
0.08
0.51
0.11
0.31

0.09 (0.04)**

(0.17)*
(0.15)
(0.19)***
(0.17)
(0.24)

0.25
o0.0001
127

0.28
0.09
0.51
0.16
0.33

0.08 (0.04)**

—
—
0.08 (0.03)***
0.01 (0.04)
—
—
—
—

0.47 (0.21)**

0.49 (0.21)**

0.28 (0.11)**
0.05 (0.15)
—
—
—
—
—
—

Model 2

Model 1

H1: Firm innovation growth rate

(0.17)*
(0.16)
(0.19)***
(0.20)
(0.25)

0.24
o0.0001
127

0.28
0.07
0.53
0.17
0.31

0.08 (0.04)**

0.29
0.30
0.08
0.05

—
—
—
—
(0.11)**
(0.19)
(0.17)
(0.26)

47 (0.23)**

Model 3

(1.13)**
(1.02)
(1.29)
(1.19)
(1.65)*
0.057
0.059
127

2.65
0.12
0.38
0.24
2.98

(1.14)**
(1.03)
(1.29)
(1.13)
(1.66)*
0.053
0.07
127

2.64
0.08
0.41
0.62
3.11

0.12 (0.26)

—
—
0.39 (0.19)**
0.01 (0.28)
—
—
—
—

1.59 (0.73)**
0.38 (1.03)
—
—
—
—
—
—

0.13 (0.25)

1.10 (1.45)

Model 5

1.21 (1.44)

Model 4

1.69 (1.53)

Model 6

(1.16)**
(1.05)
(1.31)
(1.32)
(1.67)*
0.05
0.096
127

2.86
0.08
0.28
0.18
2.97

0.04 (0.27)

—
—
—
—
1.61 (0.78)**
2.34 (1.29)*
0.03 (1.12)
1.57 (1.77)

H2: Firm international innovation level
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—

—

—
—
0.03 (0.03)
—
—
0.10 (0.05)**
40 (111)
—
—
848 (154)***
—
—
—
29 (449)
—
—
261 (748)
—
—
3372 (619)***
—
—
165 (1007)
—

Asian Business & Management

—

0.42
o0.0001
127

0.46
o0.0001
127

0.46
o0.0001
127

Model 11

—
0.01 (0.04)

0.08 (0.01)***

0.13
0.0014
127

0.65
o0.0001
64

0.17 (0.05)*** 0.03 (0.05)
0.06 (0.05)
0.04 (0.05)
0.01 (0.07)
—

0.07(0.05)
0.04 (0.04)

—

0.03 (0.03)
0.10 (0.03)***
—
—
—
—
—
—

Model 13

0.17
0.0001
127

Model 14
0.30 (0.055)***

—
0.003(0.05)

0.07 (0.01)***

0.66
o0.0001
64

0.40
o0.0001
64

0.16 (0.07)**
—
—

0.10 (0.06)*
0.21 (0.06)***

—

—
—
—
—
0.01 (0.008)
—
0.03 (0.01)***
—
—
0.02 (0.04)
—
0.10 (0.08)
—
0.19 (0.04)***
—
0.08 (0.08)

0.15 (0.05)*** 0.01 (0.05)
0.07 (0.05)
0.01 (0.05)
0.006 (0.07)
—

0.08 (0.05)*
0.04 (0.04)

—

—
—
0.01 (0.01)
0.04 (0.01)***
—
—
—
—

0.36 (0.03)*** 0.06 (0.06)

Model 12

Firm technological diversification (H3b, H4b)
Model 15

0.52
o0.0001
64

0.04 (0.04)
0.06 (0.04)
—

—
0.003 (0.03)

0.07 (0.01)***

—
—
—
—
0.01 (0.03)
0.07 (0.04)
0.06 (0.04)*
0.06 (0.06)

0.01 (0.05)

Notes: *Po0.10; **Po0.05; ***Po0.01. In parentheses are standard errors; Note the sample size is different for Models 11, 13, 14 and 15 because they run to only industries with vertical keiretsu
presence, to reflect the different and more accurate results for vertical variables in the limited case. The results of other models are essentially unchanged when restricting the analysis to the relevant
industries with vertical keiretsu presence and so results in the big sample without limiting the industries are shown in these models.

Adjusted R2
Model significance: P-value of F
N

Model 10
0.37 (0.03)*** 0.08 (0.06)

296 (440)
2719 (607)***
—
—
—
—
—
—

Model 9
47 (425)

Model 8
14 (411)

Model 7

42 (439)

Firm number of innovations (H3a, H4a)

Industry control variables
Chemical and pharmaceutical
1224 (623)*
1313 (601)**
1335(604)**
Metals and mechanical
58 (599)
155 (581)
263 (590)
engineering
Electrical and electronic
4232 (631)*** 4003 (614)*** 4004 (616)***
Motor vehicles and transportation 174 (706)
172 (642)
596 (731)
Non-metallic mineral products
221 (988)
304 (960)
403 (964)

Control for firm size
Log firm number of innovations

Constant
Independent variables
Horizontal affiliation
Vertical affiliation
Horizontal strength of tie
Vertical strength of tie
Horizontal strong connection
Horizontal weak connection
Vertical core firm
Vertical non-core firm
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strong tie with their horizontal business group, but not significant for firms
only having a weak tie with their group. In this article, we have suggested that
the strength of horizontal ties is positively related to the rate of firm innovation, because of the diversity of knowledge spillovers made feasible by such
ties. Moreover, this effect is likely to be reinforced by the recent trend towards
an increased role for general-purpose technologies – most importantly ICT –
and a rise in technological interrelatedness during the post-war period, which
has led innovations to depend increasingly on diverse or complex new
combinations of knowledge.
This finding is consistent with the argument in the business groups literature that diversified business groups are responses to different economic
and institutional circumstances; in Asia, they generally do not seem to incur
the same kind of unrelated diversification discount that is commonly
observed in the United States or Western Europe, but may often hold
benefits for knowledge spillovers, innovation and corporate profitability
among participating firms (for example, Khanna and Palepu, 2000). This
kind of diversification in horizontal business group networks, although
mainly motivated for financial reasons and unrelated at the start, does seem
to have created some synergies and innovation benefits in the specific
institutional environment of Japan.
With respect to the firm international innovation level, Models 4, 5 and 6
show that both horizontal business group affiliation and strength of tie have a
highly significant negative relationship with firm international innovation level,
although in Model 6 the significance is greater in the case of firms with strong
ties than for firms with weak ties to their horizontal business groups. This
confirms the supposition in Hypothesis 2 that horizontal business group firms
are more constrained in utilizing an international network and engaging in
innovation abroad. At the same time, the result does not show that belonging
to a vertical business group network has any significant effect on a firm’s
degree of internationalization of innovation. Thus, although this result
supports the contention that the closed nature of Japanese business group
networks has affected the ability of Japanese firms to engage in international
network-building and innovation, this effect seems mostly on firms belonging
to horizontal business group networks, not those belonging to vertical business
group networks. This finding is one of the central contributions of this article.
Models 7 and 8, regarding the firm level of innovation, and Models 10
and 12, regarding firm technological diversification, show that vertical business
group affiliation and strength of tie have a highly significant positive relationship with the number of innovations as measured by the number of patents
(Hypothesis 3a is supported), and with the firm’s level of technological
diversification (Hypothesis 3b is supported). This supports the arguments that
vertical firms tend to become technologically both larger and more diversified,
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owing to the transaction cost and learning advantages provided by the vertical
alliances of the group.
However, as we separate out core and non-core firms in vertical business
groups, some more interesting results emerge. Model 9 in the case of the firm
number of innovations and Model 14 in the case of firm technological diversification show that core firms in vertical business groups have significantly positive
effects on both firm number of innovations and technological diversification,
which supports our Hypotheses 4a and 4b. At the same time, the evidence also
shows that non-core firms are not significantly different in their number of
innovations, and across all industries have a significantly negative effect on firm
technological diversification.6 These further results show that the previously
noted positive effect of vertical keiretsu membership on a firm’s total number
of innovations and technological diversification are mainly driven by the core
firms in the vertical business group, owing to the fact that these play a central
coordinating role and thus attain a larger number of innovations and wider
breadth of knowledge. For the smaller supplier firms in the vertical business
groups, they may actually have less (narrower) technological diversification
associated with a more focused (niche form of) specialization.
These latter findings for non-core firms in vertical groups help us to address
the fact that, at first glance, it might be argued that there is a potential conflict
between the results in Hypotheses 1 and 3a, as a firm that has a consistently
high growth rate in its innovation activities should eventually end up with a
higher level of innovation too. It should also be recalled here that, as explained
earlier, the perspective that lies behind H1 is highly relevant to the period in
question. The period from 1969–1995 is one in which there were sweeping
changes across the industrial world because of the widespread application
of information and electronic technologies, which led to a wide range of more
diverse knowledge combinations to stimulate the transmission of innovations
between industries. Thus, the support for Hypothesis 1 is likely to have been
accentuated by the characteristics of this period. If this environment for
innovation were to be sustained, firms affiliated with horizontal groups may
indeed eventually come to have on average a larger innovation scale, were their
high rates of innovation growth through inter-industry knowledge spillovers to
continue to accumulate towards a higher level of innovative activity compared
to non-horizontal firms.
However, any potential remaining inconsistency between the arguments
behind Hypothesis 1 (horizontal network firms have sustained a faster recent
rate of innovation) and Hypothesis 3a (vertical network firms generate a higher
absolute level of innovative effort) is resolved once we take account of the need
to qualify Hypothesis 3a in light of our findings with respect to Hypotheses 4a
and 4b (not only are the core firms of vertical networks responsible for a higher
level of innovative activity, but for the non-core firms of vertical networks,
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if anything the reverse is true). Thus, it seems likely that the higher level of
innovative activities we find in vertical network firms on average owes
primarily to the quite highly skewed distribution of these innovative knowledge-creating activities across the firms of a vertical system, or in other words
to the high degree of concentration of such activities in the core firms of the
network (as argued in support of Hypotheses 4a and 4b).
Although our study is limited to large firms and thus may only include
selected firms in the keiretsu groups, we believe the results are indicative of the
general effects of these groups on the pattern of innovation across member
versus non-member firms. However, it is clearly relevant here that our study
has been of those of the world’s largest industrial firms that originate in Japan,
rather than all Japanese firms that may or may not have participated in
horizontal or vertical keiretsu. We might have expected, had we examined a
wider variation of firm sizes, that the contrast between the core and non-core
firms of a vertical business group would have been even greater. In that
broader context of medium-sized and smaller firms, as well as the largest firms,
it may be that vertical business group firms considered collectively have not
enjoyed a higher level of innovation activities in general, but rather it is only
the core firms of these networks that have a higher level of innovation. The fact
that we have intentionally selected only the largest firms implies that we are
more likely to capture the effects of the core vertical business group firms
(which are also the largest) than non-core firms (many of which are not among
the largest firms).
In addition, as there is a widely established theoretical and empirical robust
geometric relationship between technological diversification and technological
size (for example, Caves, 1996; Archibugi and Pianta, 1992), further regressions
were run to explore the effect of horizontal and vertical business group
affiliation and strength on technological diversification, when adding a control
for firm size, as measured by the log of the number of innovations. In this
context, we find that it makes a difference if we restrict our analysis to those
industries in which vertical groups are present, and thus these are the results
we report in Table 4, across 64 firms in the relevant industries, as opposed
to the 127 we have in our study in all industries. The results are shown in
Models 11, 13 and 15, which indicate that log (total patents) is highly
significant (P o 0.0001), and vertical business group affiliation, strength of tie
and the status of being a core firm in the group retain their significance when
log (total patents) is included. This implies that even allowing for their larger
size, which is associated with greater diversification, the core firms of vertical
business groups have especially highly diversified profiles of technological
activity. In other words, Hypothesis 4b is particularly strongly supported, even
relative to Hypothesis 4a. If the relationships between size, diversification and
vertical group status are plotted on a graph, as in Figure 2, we would see that
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Technological
Diversification

Firms belonging
to vertical
business groups

Core firms in
vertical
business groups

Firms not
belonging to
vertical business
groups

Log of number of innovations

Figure 2: Comparing the number of innovations and technological diversification of core
firms, non-core firms in vertical business groups and firms not belonging to vertical business
groups.

the core firms in a vertical business group tend to be positioned higher than
other firms over and above the line that denotes the relationship between
number of innovations and technological diversification. This suggests that in
vertical production structures, downstream user companies tend to ‘know
more than they do’, and thus maintain a broader internal technological
diversification in order to better interact with their suppliers, which applies
especially to the core firms of a vertical business group network. As we have
argued earlier, this is the primary feature of the model of innovation that
characterizes a vertical network.
Some interesting sectoral patterns also emerge from the analyses. In
Hypothesis 1, it is shown that firms in the electrical and electronic industry
have much higher rates of innovation growth than firms in other industries.
This is probably because of the underlying characteristic of the industry, which
is R&D-intensive, exhibited rapid technological progress during the period
in question, and presents relentless challenges for firms to innovate continuously, and it may also be partly attributable to having a higher propensity
to patent than in other industries. In Hypotheses 3a and 3b, 4a and 4b, both
the chemical and pharmaceutical industry and the electrical and electronic
industry are characterized by firms that have a larger technological size and
higher technological diversification than firms in other industries, with the
electrical and electronic industry having a much more significant difference. In
terms of innovation internationalization, we note that chemical and pharmaceutical firms are significantly ahead of firms in other industries, and tend to
engage in more international technology development. The chemical and
pharmaceutical industries are research-intensive industries that are relatively
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more highly internationalized, and the higher international innovation of
Japanese firms in this industry is in large part due to the fact that this is a
notably weak industry in Japan, but with great strategic importance, and thus
Japanese firms feel a greater urgency to seek cutting-edge knowledge abroad.
Not surprisingly, this is also an industry in which Japan has been encouraging
inward foreign direct investment.

Conclusions and Future Extensions
The contribution of this article is that it shows that horizontal and vertical
business group networks, although both a closed type of network with strong
ties among members, have very different forms of interfirm linkages, promote
different knowledge-creation mechanisms, and thus have different effects
on firm innovation and global learning. This adds to the wide literature on
networks and innovation, in that, when considering the effects of networks on
innovation, not only do we need to consider the openness or closedness of the
network and the strength of ties, but also the underlying interfirm linkage
mechanisms.
First of all, the findings in this article offer support to the idea that
horizontal and vertical business group networks promote different kinds of
innovation. We find that although both are stable, tightly knit networks,
horizontal business group networks contribute more to knowledge exploration
through recombinations of complementary technologies and diffusion of
general-purpose technologies (by providing a means to better explore the
diversity of potential general-purpose applications), whereas vertical business
group networks contribute more to the effectiveness of knowledge exploitation, owing to their coordination advantages along the supply chain of the
manufacture of complex products.
Furthermore, a second contribution of this article is that it shows that these
two different types of business group network also have different effects on
global learning, owing to the different kinds of relationships at home. Here,
experience from Japanese business group networks shows that it depends on
whether the existing domestic closed network constitutes a substitute or
complement for any desired open international network, with regard to their
respective purposes. As international networks have increasingly often served
the purpose of knowledge exploration, horizontal business group networks
become more of a substitute and constraint on the development of international networks for technology-seeking; whereas vertical business group
networks can more easily allow the coexistence of open international networks
and become mutual complements, as they serve different functions of knowledge exploitation versus knowledge exploration.
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With the Japanese economy still in the doldrums, it has been increasingly
realized by both academics and officials that Japanese firms need to reform
domestic institutions and further open up international interactions to help
address problems at home (Best, 2000; Ozawa, 2003). The center of the debate
has continued to be the extent and focus of the reforms. The relevant
implication of this article for this debate is that it suggests that horizontal
business group networks may be more constraining with respect to international interactions, and thus more in need of reform in order to open up. In
fact, reforms have been occurring in the keiretsu system; although relationships
are still central to Japanese firm strategies, the business group system has been
becoming less loyalty-bound and more competitively focused (Lincoln and
Gerlach, 2004, McGuire and Dow, 2009). It is also the case that the greatest
recent transformation has occurred in the horizontally connected groups.
For example, four Megabank horizontal groups have been formed from the
original eight since April 2001.
More research is planned to further investigate the effects of different
business group networks on innovation and global learning. First, a next step
would be to examine how the effects of the two types of business groups change
over different sub-periods, to look into the evolution of the role of each type of
network over time. For example, it would be interesting to determine whether
horizontal networks have had a larger beneficial effect on innovation further
back in time, and this effect has been gradually wearing down more recently,
whereas negative consequences have gradually become more apparent. Second,
supplementing the patent count measure with cross-patent citations data would
enable us to examine in greater depth the patterns of knowledge exchange
and interaction in these innovation networks. Not only would we be able to
determine whether knowledge exchange/citations are positively affected by the
strength of ties between firms, but we can also examine the cross-field structure
of knowledge exchange within horizontal and vertical groups and internationally, and compare the technological distance between citing and cited patents
as a means of further distinguishing knowledge exploration and exploitation.
Last but not least, it would be useful to complement this study with further
qualitative case studies of innovation and overseas R&D sites in Japanese
firms to gain deeper insights into the organizational mechanisms behind this
phenomenon.
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Notes
1 For example, in Cantwell and Zhang (2006), we show that, based on data on US patents granted
to the world’s largest 770 firms, Japanese firms had only about a 1.08 per cent share of foreign
R&D in 1991–1995, compared with 8.63 per cent for US, 20.72 per cent for German, or 43.01 per
cent for UK firms. Furthermore, that percentage has been decreasing over the years for Japan,
whereas it has been increasing in other countries.
2 In addition, it is also important to note that these two types of business group represent two
dimensions of a firm’s overall nexus of relationships rather than two alternatives along a single
dimension, and firms can belong to both types of business group. Some horizontal groups also
encompass large vertically integrated groups. For example, Toyota belongs to both Mitsui (a
horizontal business group) and the Toyota Group (a vertical business group).
3 Patents represent a measure of inventions and advances in knowledge generated by firms as
technological inputs into the development of new products and processes, and thus can serve as a
good proxy measure for downstream innovation activity, as well as of the inventive output of
formal in-house R&D, especially in large firms (which have a high propensity to patent the
knowledge inputs they create, unlike some smaller firms [Mansfield, 1986; Griliches, 1990]). US
patenting data are relatively well designed for the purpose of this study, owing to the historical
consistency of the US patent system and the usually higher quality of patents filed in the United
States. As the United States is the world’s largest single market, firms (especially large ones) tend
to file their more important patents there after patenting and further testing in their home
countries. The tendency of large firms to apply for US patents is true regardless of whether they
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themselves serve the US market, as if they are not themselves active in the United States, they
wish to license their intellectual property to other firms that do serve this large market (Soete and
Wyatt, 1983). It has been shown that Japanese firms have been especially aggressive in patenting
in the United States, and careful to patent their most useful inventions in both the United States
and Japan. Hence, corporate US patent data are well suited to the study of Japanese firm
innovation and overseas knowledge sourcing (for example, Iwasa and Odagiri, 2004).
4 For the construction of the DIV index, as technological diversification represents the extent of
dispersion of the technological fields of specialization for the firm, it is measured here by the
inverse of the coefficient of variation (CV) across a firm’s profile of technological specialization.
This profile of technological specialization, in turn, is derived from the distribution of the
revealed technological advantage (RTA) index, as explained below. Therefore, for each firm,
DIV ¼ 1/CV ¼ mRTA/oRTA, where oRTA is the standard deviation and mRTA is the mean value of
the RTA distribution for the firm. To measure profiles of technological specialization, the
distribution of the RTA index across the firm’s various fields of activity is used. The RTA index
shows the revealed technological advantage of the firm in each respective field. The RTA index
of a firm in a particular field is given by the firm’s share of US patents in that field granted to
companies in the same industry, relative to the firm’s overall share of all US patents in all fields
assigned to firms in the industry in question. Therefore, RTAij ¼ (Pij / Sj Pij) / (Si Pij / Sij Pij),
where Pij denotes the number of US patents granted in field i to firm j. The index varies around
unity; such that values greater than one suggest that a firm is comparatively specialized in the
activity in question relative to other firms in the same industry. Similarly, values less than one are
indicative of a lack of specialization by the standards of the industry.
5 These factors include: the group’s influential power (the ratio of the group’s shareholding to total
shares by top ten shareholders), the characteristics and historical background of the group and
company, sources and amounts of bank loans, board directors sent by and/or coming from
nucleus group companies, company attitude toward the group, and company connections with
non-group companies and/or other groups. Tie strength is denoted as 1, 2, 3 or 4, with 4
indicating it is nucleus (core) group company; 3 meaning association with the group is strong,
with the business group’s influence being 50 per cent or above; 2 meaning connected, but its links
are not particularly strong, with the group’s influence being 30–49 per cent; and 1 representing
weak affiliation with the group, the group’s influence being less than 30 per cent.
6 But note that if Model 14 is rerun for just those industries in which vertical business groups are
present, as shown in Table 4, we find that within these industries non-core vertical group firms
are not significantly different in terms of technological diversification, as well as not significantly
different in terms of technological size. However, in our study it is far more difficult for us to
generalize about non-core firms for the vertical groups than it is about core firms. This is because
our study is devoted to the largest firms, which means we have a comprehensive coverage of the
core firms of vertical business groups, but only a partial coverage of the non-core firms, which is
restricted to those that are (among non-core firms) the largest and most diversified.

References
Ahuja, G. (2000) Collaboration networks, structural holes, and innovation. Administrative Science
Quarterly 45: 425–455.
Andersson, U., Forsgren, M. and Holm, U. (2002) The strategic impact of external networks:
Subsidiary performance and competence development in the multinational corporation.
Strategic Management Journal 23: 979–996.
r 2011 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1472-4782

Asian Business & Management

Vol. 10, 2, 151–181 177

Zhang and Cantwell

Archibugi, D. and Pianta, M. (1992) Specialization and size of technological activities in industrial
countries. Research Policy 21: 79–93.
Asakawa, K. (1996) External-internal linkages and overseas autonomy-control tension: The
management dilemma of Japanese R&D in Europe. IEEE Transactions on Engineering
Management 43(1): 24–32.
Bartlett, C. and Ghoshal, S. (1989) Managing Across Borders - The Transnational Solution. London:
Century Business.
Baum, J. and Ingram, P. (2000) Inter-Organizational Learning and Network Organization: Toward
a Behavioral Theory of the Interfirm. Working paper, University of Toronto Rotman School of
Management.
Belderbos, R. (2001) Overseas innovation by Japanese firms: A micro-econometrical analysis
of patent and subsidiary data. Research Policy 30: 313–332.
Benner, M. and Tushman, M. (2003) Exploitation, exploration and process management: The
productivity dilemma revisited. Academy of Management Review 28(2): 238–256.
Berry, H. (2006) Leaders, laggards and the pursuit of foreign knowledge. Strategic Management
Journal 27(2): 151–168.
Best, M.H. (2000) Silicon Valley and the resurgence of route 128. In: J.H. Dunning (ed.) Regions,
Globalization and the Knowledge-Based Economy. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press,
pp. 495–484.
Birkinshaw, J. and Hood, N. (1998) Multinational subsidiary development: Capability evolution
and charter change in foreign-owned subsidiary companies. Academy of Management Review
23(4): 773–795.
Blau, P. (1974) Parameters of social structure. American Sociological Review 39(5): 615–635.
Bonaccorsi, A. and Giuri, P. (2001) The long-term evolution of vertically-related industries.
International Journal of Industrial Organization 19(7): 1053–1083.
Brass, D., Galaskiewicz, J., Greve, H. and Tasi, W. (2004) Taking stock of networks and
organizations. Academy of Management Journal 47(6): 795–817.
Brusoni, S., Principe, A. and Pavitt, K.L.R. (2001) Knowledge specialization, organizational
coupling and the boundaries of the firm: Why do firms know more than they make?
Administrative Science Quarterly 46: 597–621.
Burt, R.S. (2005) Brokerage and Closure: An Introduction to Social Capital. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Cantwell, J.A. (1989) Technological Innovation and Multinational Corporations. Oxford, UK: Basil
Blackwell.
Cantwell, J.A. (1995) The globalization of technology: What remains of the product cycle model?
Cambridge Journal of Economics 19(1): 155–174.
Cantwell, J.A. (2004) An historical change in the nature of corporate technological diversification.
In: J.A. Cantwell, A. Gambardella and O. Granstrand (eds.) The Economics and Management of
Technological Diversification. London: Routledge, pp. 265–296.
Cantwell, J.A. and Zhang, Y. (2006) Why is R&D internationalization in Japanese firms so low?
A path-dependent explanation. Asian Business and Management 5(2): 249–269.
Caves, R.E. (1996) Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge
University Press.
Coleman, J.S. (1988) Social capital in the creation of human capital. American Journal of Sociology
94: S95–S120.
Collinson, S. and Wilson, D.C. (2006) Inertia in Japanese organizations: Knowledge management
routines and failure to innovate. Organization Studies 27(9): 1359–1387.
Doane, D.L. (1984) Two essays on technological innovation: Innovations and economic
stagnation, and interfirm cooperation for innovation in Japan. PhD dissertation, Department
of Economics, Yale University, New Haven.
178 r 2011 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1472-4782

Asian Business & Management

Vol. 10, 2, 151–181

Exploration and exploitation

Dodwell. (1994/95) Industrial Groupings in Japan. Tokyo, Japan: Dodwell Marketing Consultants.
Dunning, J.H. and Pearce, R.D. (1985) The World’s Largest Industrial Enterprises, 1962-1983.
Farnborough, UK: Grower.
Dunning, J.H. and Wymbs, C. (1999) The geographical sourcing of technology-based assets by
multinational enterprises. In: D. Archibugi, J. Howells and J. Michie (eds.) Innovation Policy in a
Global Economy. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 184–224.
Dyer, J. and Singh, A. (1998) The relational view: Cooperative strategy and sources of interorganizational competitive advantage. Academy of Management Review 23(4): 660–679.
Dyer, J.H. and Nobeoka, K. (2000) Creating and managing a high-performance knowledge-sharing
network: The Toyota case. Strategic Management Journal 21: 345–367.
Florida, R. and Kenney, M. (1994) The globalization of Japanese R&D: The economic geography
of Japanese R&D investments in the United States. Economic Geography 70: 344–369.
Freeman, C. and Perez, C. (1988) Structural crises of adjustment, business cycles and investment
behaviour. In: G. Dosi, C. Freeman, R.R. Nelson, G. Silverberg and L.L.G. Soete (eds.)
Technical Change and Economic Theory. London: Frances Pinter, pp. 38–66.
Frost, T.S. (2001) The geographical sources of foreign subsidiaries’ innovations. Strategic
Management Journal 22: 101–123.
Gambardella, A. and Torrisi, S. (1998) Does technological convergence imply convergence in
markets? Evidence from the electronics industry. Research Policy 27: 445–463.
Gerlach, M. (1987) Business alliances and the strategy of the Japanese firm. California Management
Review 29(1): 29–44.
Gerlach, M. (1992) Alliance Capitalism: The Social Organization of Japanese Business. Berkeley,
CA: University of California Press.
Goto, A. and Odagiri, H. (1997) Innovation in Japan. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press.
Granovetter, M. (1983) The strength of weak ties. Sociological Theory 1: 201–233.
Granstrand, O. (1999) Internationalization of corporate R&D: A study of Japanese and Swedish
corporations. Research Policy 28: 275–302.
Granstrand, O., Patel, P. and Pavitt, K.L.R. (1997) Multi-technology corporations: Why they have
‘distributed’ rather than ‘distinctive core’ competencies. California Management Review 30: 8–25.
Griliches, Z. (1990) Patent statistics as economic indicators. Journal of Economic Literature 28(4):
1661–1707.
Gulati, R., Nohria, N. and Zaheer, A. (2000) Strategic networks. Strategic Management Journal
104(5): 1439–1493.
Hall, B. and Trajtenberg, M. (2006) Uncovering general purpose technologies with patent data.
In: C. Antonelli, D. Foray, B.H. Hall and W.E. Steinmueller (eds.) New Frontiers in the
Economics of Innovation and New Technology. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, pp. 389–426.
Ibata-Arens, K.C. and Obayashi, H. (2006) Escaping the Japanese pyramid: The association of
small and medium-sized enterprise entrepreneurs (SME Doyukai), 1947–1999. Enterprise &
Society 7(1): 128–163.
Imai, K. (1989) Evolution of Japan’s corporate and industrial networks. In: B. Carlsson (ed.)
Industrial Dynamics. Dordrecht, MA: Kluwer, pp. 123–156.
Iwasa, T. and Odagiri, H. (2004) Overseas R&D, knowledge sourcing and patenting: An empirical
study of Japanese R&D investment in the US. Research Policy 33: 807–828.
Japan Fair Trade Commission. (2001) The state of corporate groups in Japan: Seventh survey report.
Khanna, T. and Palepu, K. (2000) Is group membership profitable in emerging markets?
An analysis of diversified Indian business groups. Journal of Finance 55: 867–891.
Kodama, F. (1995) Emerging Patterns of Innovation: Sources of Japan’s Technological Edge.
Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.
Kogut, B. (2000) The network as knowledge: Generative rules and the emergence of structure.
Strategic Management Journal 21: 405–425.
r 2011 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1472-4782

Asian Business & Management

Vol. 10, 2, 151–181 179

Zhang and Cantwell

Kogut, B. and Chang, S.J. (1991) Technological capabilities and Japanese foreign direct investment
in the United States. Review of Economics and Statistics 3: 400–413.
Kogut, B. and Zander, U. (1992) Knowledge of the firm, combinative capabilities and the
replication of technology. Organization Science 3: 383–397.
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